Antisemitism

Left/Right Convergence: AI on American Antisemitism

by

Introduction

In the near-future United States, the rise of a right-wing authoritarian or neoreactionary regime could create fertile ground for an unlikely synthesis of extremist ideologies. One particularly dangerous possibility is a convergence between traditionally right-wing and left-wing forms of antisemitism. Historically, antisemitic narratives have appeared across the political spectrum – from fascist movements to far-left regimes – often as a tool for authoritarian leaders to scapegoat “enemies” and unite factions. This report analyzes how an American authoritarian regime might foster such a convergence of antisemitism, what mechanisms and narratives would enable it, and the forms it could take (institutional, cultural, violent, rhetorical). The analysis draws on political theory (authoritarianism and fascism), scholarly research on antisemitism (both right and left variants), historical case studies of regimes using antisemitism across ideological lines, and current U.S. political dynamics – including state repression, manipulated pro-Israel rhetoric, leftist radicalization amid crises, and shifts in narratives due to the declining popularity of Israel’s Netanyahu government.

Antisemitism and Authoritarianism: Historical and Theoretical Background

Authoritarian and fascist regimes have frequently used antisemitism as a unifying scapegoat ideology. Classic fascist theory shows that such regimes thrive on creating a common enemy to blame for societal problems. Notably, Nazi propaganda accused Jews of simultaneously being the masterminds of both communism and capitalism – a paradoxical narrative that allowed Hitler’s regime to demonize “Jewish Bolsheviks” on the left and “Jewish bankers” on the right. By portraying Jews as the hidden hand behind opposing forces (plutocratic finance and Marxist revolution), the Nazis juggled left-wing and right-wing grievances into a single antisemitic conspiracy theory. This historical example illustrates how an authoritarian movement can bridge ideological divides using antisemitism.

Other regimes have also deployed antisemitism across ideological boundaries. In the Soviet Union under Stalin – a far-left authoritarian context – antisemitic tropes surfaced in campaigns against “rootless cosmopolitans” (often code for Jews) and during the Doctors’ Plot. A striking case occurred in communist Poland in 1968: the government launched a virulently anti-Jewish (and anti-“Zionist”) purge to deflect a domestic political crisis. Thousands of Polish Jews (many Holocaust survivors) were hounded out as alleged “fifth column” traitors for their supposed ties to Israel. Paradoxically, the communist regime embraced a nationalist antisemitic narrative – behavior more typical of the far right – to shore up its authoritarian rule. These examples underscore a key point of political theory: antisemitism is a versatile tool for authoritarians, not confined to any single ideology. As political theorist Hannah Arendt observed, totalitarian movements often weaponize conspiracy theories and bigotry to mobilize mass support and eliminate perceived opponents.

Modern neoreactionary (NRx) thought, which advocates replacing liberal democracy with authoritarian alternatives (like “CEO” dictators or techno-monarchs), could similarly exploit antisemitic narratives. While NRx theorists focus on anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic ideas, the playbook of scapegoating a vulnerable minority to legitimize repression is familiar from past authoritarianisms. A neoreactionary regime in the U.S. might resurrect coded antisemitic tropes (e.g. railing against “globalist elites” or “degenerate cosmopolitans”) as it dismantles democratic institutions. In sum, political theory and history suggest that whenever democracy erodes, scapegoating Jews has recurrently been used as a unifying logic, even bridging left-right divides, to justify authoritarian control.

Right-Wing vs. Left-Wing Antisemitism in America Today

Right-wing antisemitism in the U.S. has deep roots and has become increasingly visible in recent years. Far-right extremists propagate classic Judeophobic tropes: the notion of a secret Jewish cabal controlling finance, media, or immigration policy is rife in neo-Nazi and white supremacist circles. Slogans like “Jews will not replace us,” heard at the 2017 Charlottesville rally, reflect the “great replacement” conspiracy theory that blames Jews for orchestrating demographic change. Similarly, the QAnon and “globalist” conspiracies popular on the MAGA right often echo the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion – portraying Jewish financiers (e.g. George Soros or the Rothschilds) as puppet-masters of world events. Even as the mainstream American right proclaims strong support for the State of Israel, elements of Christian nationalism and white supremacy continue to circulate antisemitic ideas domestically. This phenomenon has been called “Zionist antisemitism” – when antisemites express support for Israel for ulterior motives. For example, some Christian Zionists and far-right nativists back Israel because they either seek fulfillment of end-times prophecy or prefer Jews to live in Israel rather than in the U.S.. Such support is *“promoted for explicitly antisemitic reasons”* – in other words, they admire Israel while still resenting Jewish influence at home. This contradiction has not gone unnoticed: scholars point out that it is entirely possible to be both pro-Israel and antisemitic. A current case in point is the tacit alliance between Israel’s right-wing leaders and Europe’s ultranationalist parties; figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán (who employs antisemitic rhetoric about “globalist Soros”) have received warmth from the Israeli government due to shared illiberal agendas, despite their antisemitism. In the U.S., the Trumpist right similarly embraced Israel’s Netanyahu even as Trump himself trafficked in stereotypes (claiming Jews are “loyal” to Israel above the U.S., etc.). Thus, American right-wing antisemitism today often manifests as explicit conspiracy theories and hate crimes (the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue massacre by a white nationalist, for example) coexisting with official philo-Zionism. This provides a template for how a future authoritarian regime might publicly hug Israel while privately demonizing Jews: it offers political cover (“we can’t be antisemitic, look how pro-Israel we are”) even as dog-whistle attacks on “globalists” galvanize the base.

Left-wing antisemitism in America is more convoluted, as the mainstream left prides itself on anti-racism – yet certain far-left currents have indeed exhibited antisemitic tendencies. Contemporary left-wing antisemitism often intertwines with anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. Legitimate criticism of Israeli government policies sometimes veers into antisemitic territory when it demonizes “Zionists” as a monolithic evil or uses age-old tropes (such as depicting Israel or Jewish lobbies as all-powerful puppet-masters). For instance, accusations that “Zionists control U.S. foreign policy” or that American Jews hold “dual loyalty” have surfaced in far-left discourse, echoing classic antisemitic canards. On the economic front, some extreme anti-capitalists obsess over “bankers” and “Wall Street elites” in a way that revives the trope of the Jewish financier. Historically, segments of the American left (e.g. certain 19th-century populists or some 1960s New Left groups) occasionally slid into blaming “Jewish bankers” for broader economic ills. In recent years, debates over the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement and campus protests against Israel have brought accusations of antisemitism on the left to the fore. While many left-wing activists distinguish anti-Zionism from anti-Judaism, there have been troubling incidents: for example, during the 2023 Israel–Gaza war, some U.S. protests crossed the line with chants seeming to celebrate violence against Jews (leading to condemnation across the spectrum). Surveys in Europe have found that antisemitic attitudes, though more prevalent on the right, are not absent on the left. In fact, emerging research on “left-wing authoritarianism” suggests that dogmatic, anti-elite leftist mindsets can also lead to antisemitic beliefs. A recent study in the UK found that a facet of left-wing authoritarian attitude – specifically “anti-hierarchical aggression” (a burning resentment toward those seen as powerful or privileged) – was the single strongest predictor of antisemitic views, even more than traditional right-wing factors. As one co-author explained, *“antisemites who believe the democratic state to be a trick played on ‘the people’ by ‘the Jews’ might feel justified in tearing it down… On the other hand, political movements that embrace conspiracy fantasies… are also likely to be open to antisemitism.”*. In short, the far left’s rage against “privileged” elites can easily target Jews (stereotyped as privileged or powerful) under conditions of stress or propaganda.

Crucially, antisemitism is not confined to either end of the spectrum. As scholar Daniel Allington notes, “Antisemitism is not associated with the political right or the political left… instead, it’s associated with attitudes that can be found across the political spectrum,” especially conspiratorial thinking, authoritarianism, and resentful aggression toward perceived “powerful” groups. This means there is an inherent potential for convergence: extreme right-wing and left-wing narratives can converge on the figure of the Jew as a convenient culprit for very different grievances.

Early Signs of Left–Right Antisemitic Convergence

Even prior to any hypothetical regime change, we can observe nascent signs of convergence between far-right and far-left antisemitic discourses in the U.S. and globally. Analysts sometimes describe this phenomenon as the “horseshoe theory” of extremism – the far ends of left and right bending toward each other on certain views.

One striking recent example arose from the Israel–Hamas war of October 2023. In the aftermath, American college campuses saw a surge of anti-Israel protests, some of which devolved into harassment of Jewish students. An Israeli research institute discovered that extreme right-wing antisemitic groups in the U.S. were actively infiltrating and influencing these ostensibly left-wing protests. Neo-Nazis and white supremacists covertly injected classic anti-Jewish conspiracy memes (like the Protocols or “New World Order” tropes) into pro-Palestinian social media networks, aiming to radicalize left-leaning protesters against “Jews” rather than just Israeli policy. “We have seen an ideological convergence between the left and the right, which is very dangerous,” reported Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, the study’s editor. *“Even classic right-wing antisemitic messages like ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ are now leaking to the left, and suddenly antisemitism against Judaism and Zionism are merging.”*. She noted that far-right agitators view the climate of anger at Israel as a “unique opportunity to influence global sentiment against Jews”, working to shift left-wing student activists from legitimate criticism of Israeli actions to outright antisemitic aggression. In essence, the far-right is piggybacking on left-wing outrage to mainstream its own hate – a literal convergence on the ground, with *“Jews as their common enemy.”*.

This example highlights how narratives can jump the ideological divide in times of crisis. Far-left movements often frame their struggle as against colonialism or capitalism, while far-right movements rail against globalist conspiracies – but both can be steered toward blaming Jews by introduction of the right propaganda. Social media and “alternative” online platforms accelerate this cross-pollination of ideas. As Dr. Koblentz-Stenzler observed, college students consuming anti-Israel content on social networks often “don’t realize that this discourse partly comes from the extreme right, from people of ‘white supremacy.’” They undergo a process of cumulative radicalization, and ultimately “experience shows that… there will be violence” if this synergy continues.

Beyond the campus context, other signs of a red–brown alliance (to use a term for far-left/far-right cooperation) have appeared. In Europe and the U.S., anti-vaccine and anti-lockdown conspiracy movements during the COVID-19 pandemic attracted both left-leaning anti-establishment individuals and far-right activists; these spaces became hotbeds of antisemitic theories (from blaming the pandemic on Jewish scientists to comparing vaccines to “Jewish plots”). Likewise, some anti-globalization and anti-banking narratives have found adherents on both extremes – for instance, the slogan “abolish the Federal Reserve” can emerge from a libertarian right view or a socialist left view, yet historically, the Fed and banking conspiracies often spiral into talk of Rothschilds and Jewish bankers if pushed further.

In American political discourse, mainstream voices have begun acknowledging the two-sided nature of the antisemitism problem. A Pew Research survey in 2024 showed a polarization in attitudes toward Israel and Jews that could presage convergence in strange ways. It found that a majority of Americans (53%) now have little or no confidence in Israel’s Prime Minister (Netanyahu), with Democrats especially skeptical and Republicans more supportive. About half of Democratic members of Congress even boycotted Netanyahu’s 2024 speech in D.C., reflecting a collapse of the old bipartisan pro-Israel consensus. At the same time, Republican leaders doubled down on characterizing left-wing Israel critics as antisemitic. For example, after the 2023 Gaza war, some GOP politicians (like Rep. Elise Stefanik) aggressively targeted university leftists for tolerating “antisemitism” on campus. Here we see pro-Israel rhetoric being weaponized for partisan aims – arguably a form of manipulation. While claiming to defend Jewish students, right-wing figures also amplify the notion that liberal academia is a hive of Jew-hatred, stoking fear and anger. The consequence of this dynamic is that Jews are increasingly a focal point of political conflict: the right accuses the left of antisemitism, and the left accuses the right of using Jews as pawns or of harboring hidden antisemitism behind a pro-Israel mask. American Jews thus face hostility from both extremes: some on the left label them colonial oppressors if they support Israel, while some on the right label them disloyal globalists if they don’t toe a nationalist line. This bitter polarization itself sets the stage for an authoritarian actor to exploit antisemitism as a unifying narrative – by siding with both critiques at once, in a calculated way.

Mechanisms Enabling Convergence Under a Right-Wing Authoritarian Regime

If a new right-wing authoritarian or neoreactionary regime came to power in Washington, how exactly might it orchestrate a convergence of right- and left-wing antisemitism? Several mechanisms and narrative strategies can be envisioned:

  • Populist Scapegoating “from Above”: The regime’s leadership could propagate grand conspiracy theories that assign blame for national troubles to a shadowy cabal of elites – a cabal pointedly identified as Jewish. This would echo the Nazi tactic of yore, updated for American audiences. For example, facing economic stagnation or climate disasters, the government might declare that “international bankers and global financiers” (timeworn codewords) sabotaged the country. Such rhetoric appeals to far-right audiences who readily decipher “bankers/globalists” as the Jews, and it can also resonate with far-left anti-capitalist sentiments (by reinforcing the narrative that the ultra-rich are behind the people’s misery). In effect, the regime would synthesize the far-right’s antisemitic image of the “Jewish globalist” with the far-left’s image of the “greedy oligarch” into one scapegoat: a Jewish financier class allegedly undermining the nation. A historical parallel is instructive: Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels managed to attack “plutocratic” England and Bolshevik Russia in one breath by claiming both capitalism and communism were Jewish plots. An American neoreactionary regime could similarly juggle multiple enemies by positing an overarching Jewish conspiracy that ties together Wall Street, Hollywood, socialist organizers, and any other convenient foes.
  • “Two-Faced” Propaganda – Enemy Jews vs. Ally Jews: The regime might distinguish between “good Jews” and “bad Jews” in its narrative, to broaden its appeal. Specifically, it could continue a staunchly pro-Israel, Zionist-friendly public stance (to satisfy Christian Zionist allies and project an image of tolerance), while simultaneously demonizing diaspora or liberal Jews as subversive. This approach has precedent in current right-wing politics. We have seen American and European ultraconservatives embrace Israel’s nationalist policies but vilify Jewish philanthropists (like Soros) or liberal Jewish Americans. Under an authoritarian regime, state media might, for instance, lavish praise on Israel’s militarism or even collaborate with Israel’s right-wing factions, all while spreading antisemitic depictions of domestic Jewish journalists, academics, or opposition figures as disloyal “cosmopolitans.” This manipulation of pro-Israel rhetoric serves as camouflage: it allows the regime to claim “We cannot possibly be antisemitic – look at our alliance with Israel!” even as it advances antisemitic tropes internally. Such Zionist antisemitism would encourage a convergence in perception: the far-right base hears that “bad liberal Jews” are being targeted (pleasing their antisemitism), and even some disaffected leftists might agree if those same “bad Jews” are Wall Street CEOs or pro-war politicians. Meanwhile, the regime portrays itself as the true friend of the Jewish people by defending Israel – a stance which could confuse or neutralize mainstream criticism. Over time, this split messaging blurs the lines, fostering an atmosphere where attacking certain categories of Jews becomes acceptable across ideologies (e.g. “globalist” Jews are vilified by right and left alike), even as token support for Israel persists.
  • Repression Framed as Anti-Antisemitism: In a dark irony, a repressive government might justify crackdowns on left-wing dissidents by accusing them of antisemitism, thus co-opting liberal outrage against hate for illiberal ends. We have a small preview of this: in 2019, then-President Trump signed an Executive Order broadening Title VI civil rights rules to punish campuses for Israel-related “antisemitism,” which some feared would be used to police pro-Palestinian speech. An authoritarian regime could take this much further – establishing, say, a “Commission to Combat Antisemitism” with sweeping powers (a real proposal was floated in Congress in 2023). Under the banner of protecting Jewish people, such a body might harass and surveil left-wing activists, labeling harsh critics of Israel or capitalism as hate-mongers. This McCarthyite use of antisemitism would serve two purposes: eliminating leftist opposition (pleasing the right), and reinforcing the narrative that the regime is defending Jews (potentially winning grudging assent from centrists or even some Jewish groups). However, the long-term effect could be to validate antisemitic conspiracy beliefs on the left. As genuine left-wing dissenters are silenced with charges of antisemitism, they may start believing that “the Jews” truly are behind the repression (after all, it’s being done in Jews’ name). This perverse dynamic could radicalize some leftists into antisemitic views they didn’t previously hold – exactly the convergence the regime desires, where the far left starts echoing the far right in seeing Jewish power everywhere.
  • Controlled Opposition and “Red-Brown” Alliances: Authoritarian regimes often manipulate or create opposition factions to fragment resistance. A neoreactionary U.S. regime might covertly encourage collaboration between fringe elements of the left and right around shared antisemitic ideas. For instance, it could allow white nationalist groups and extreme anti-Zionist left groups to coordinate (as was observed via clandestine networks on social media), thus isolating mainstream anti-regime voices. If the public sees anti-government protests carrying both swastikas and anti-Israel slogans, it delegitimizes the opposition in the public eye while reinforcing the regime’s narrative that “extremists on all sides are Jew-haters.” In a sense, the regime wouldn’t need to formally unite far-right and far-left antisemites; it merely needs to create conditions where their messages amplify each other. This might involve state propaganda seeding identical talking points in far-left economic discourse and far-right cultural discourse. For example, state trolls could spread memes on leftist forums blaming high food prices on greedy “Zionist capitalists,” while simultaneously feeding far-right forums content about “cultural Marxist Jews” undermining social values. Over time, both extreme subsets are singing a complementary tune (Jews are the problem), orchestrated by an unseen hand of the regime’s intelligence apparatus.
  • Exploiting Crises and Narratives of Collapse: Global crises – financial crashes, pandemics, climate disasters, or wars – provide flashpoints where antisemitic conspiracy theories typically surge. An authoritarian regime would likely exploit any major crisis to cement its power by blaming a convenient minority. If an economic depression hits, the regime might resurrect the old trope of the “parasitic financier Jew” as the cause of ordinary people’s suffering. If climate change causes chaos, perhaps they’d claim environmental devastation or global refugee flows are due to a “globalist plot” by rich cosmopolitan elites (again implying Jewish bankers or philanthropists thwarting national solutions). Even responses to crises can be twisted: for instance, if left-wing climate activists grow radical (in response to governmental inaction), the regime could accuse them of being unwitting agents of a Jewish-led “green scam” to weaken America’s industry. Conversely, if the regime’s policies (say, war in the Middle East or domestic mass surveillance) spark leftist protests, it can dismiss those protests as either antisemitic (if the protesters are anti-Israel) or as orchestrated by Jewish manipulators (if protesters are anti-Wall Street or anti-war, tie them to a “Soros” figure funding chaos). The key mechanism is narrative flexibility: by constantly shifting blame to Jews for whichever angle of dissent or hardship arises, the regime creates a catch-all explanation that unites discontented rightists and leftists under one grand conspiracy. This is essentially the umbrella narrative approach – all problems trace back to the machinations of a Jewish “Other,” whether labeled as globalists, Zionists, cosmopolitans, or financiers depending on the audience.

In summary, a right-wing authoritarian U.S. regime could enable convergence by playing a double game: openly aligning with Israel and “defending” Jews when it serves to attack leftists, but quietly validating and spreading antisemitic conspiracies to satisfy the far-right base and scapegoat opponents. Through state-controlled media, education, and surveillance, it would blur distinctions until many average citizens – whether of right or left inclination – find themselves subscribing to some form of the regime’s antisemitic narratives.

Potential Manifestations of Convergent Antisemitism

Should these mechanisms take hold, what tangible forms might this convergence of antisemitism assume in the near- to medium-term future? We can project several notional scenarios across different domains:

  • Institutional Measures: Under pressure from both far-right nativists and some radical left voices, the regime might enact new laws or policies targeting Jews (even if not explicitly stated as such). For example, under the guise of national security or “anti-elitism,” authorities could impose strict controls on Jewish civic organizations, charities, or even businesses. A precedent for this is how communist Poland required Jewish clubs and publications to shut down in 1968 during its “anti-Zionist” campaign. In the U.S. context, one could imagine a federal mandate that any Jewish-affiliated organization (from AIPAC to the Jewish Federations) register as a “foreign agent” (falsely insinuating dual loyalty to Israel). This would be sold to the public as cracking down on “foreign influence” – something both right-wing isolationists and left-wing anti-imperialists might applaud. Another institutional manifestation might be purges within the government or academia: a neoreactionary leadership might quietly remove Jews from high-ranking positions under the pretext that they’re part of the old “globalist” establishment. Over time, universities might be pressured to limit Jewish studies programs or Israel exchanges, while law enforcement agencies could deprioritize protection for Jewish sites. In an extreme but not implausible case, the regime could establish detention or surveillance programs specifically for individuals deemed part of “Jewish networks” undermining America (rationalized perhaps as rooting out economic saboteurs or agents of a Zionist lobby). While such moves would initially provoke outrage, the regime’s propagandists would ensure the narrative – that this is necessary to break the power of a corrupt elite – is echoed by both far-right militants and disillusioned left-wing populists.
  • Cultural and Media Narratives: Culturally, convergent antisemitism might manifest in popular propaganda and entertainment. State media may run documentaries “exposing” the historical role of wealthy Jewish families in American finance (playing into leftist anti-capitalist anger) as well as segments attacking Jewish intellectuals for promoting “decadent liberal values” or “woke culture” (catering to right-wing grievances). The result is a normalization of antisemitic discourse in public life. One could foresee bestselling books or viral videos that mash up themes from both the John Birch Society and Marxist critique – for instance, a pseudo-scholarly claim that a handful of Jewish bankers secretly funded both sides of every American war and bankrolled subversive socialist movements, causing all of America’s woes. Rhetorically, the stigma around blatant antisemitism might erode, replaced by coded language accepted by broad swathes of society. Terms like “globalist,” “rootless elite,” “cosmopolitan,” or “internationalist” – all historically used to mean Jews – would pervade speeches and news articles. Even left-wing outlets might start referring to “Rothschilds” or “neocons” as shorthand for evil elites without realizing (or while willfully ignoring) the antisemitic lineage of those tropes. The convergence will be evident when a far-right commentator on state TV and a far-left podcaster are unknowingly singing the same tune – lamenting how a clique of cosmopolitan financiers or Zionist warhawks have betrayed the country. Satire and art could also take a dark turn: perhaps new caricatures emerge blending the stereotypes (e.g. a cartoon depicting a figure with a banker’s suit and a revolutionary’s cap, labeled with a Star of David, thus symbolizing the mythical Jew who is both capitalist exploiter and communist agitator). Such images recall Nazi-era propaganda, but now they might surface in online memes shared by disaffected youth of various stripes.
  • Violence and Intimidation: Convergent antisemitism would almost certainly have violent consequences. On the far right, we already see paramilitary militias and lone-wolf terrorists fixating on Jewish targets (synagogues, community centers) as part of a broader race war fantasy. If a regime tacitly endorses their views, these actors could become more brazen, possibly carrying out pogrom-like attacks or assassinations of prominent Jewish figures deemed “enemies of the state.” Meanwhile, from the extreme left side, one might witness an uptick in harassment or aggression towards visibly Jewish individuals under the banner of anti-Israel direct action. In a scenario of war in the Middle East (perhaps involving Israel and Iran or proxy forces), far-left radical groups could justify vandalizing Jewish businesses or clashing with pro-Israel demonstrators, thinking they are striking against imperialism. The authoritarian state, while publicly decrying “violence,” might quietly permit both types of aggression to fester, stepping in only when convenient to its image. We could see something akin to 1930s Germany’s early years, when Nazi authorities sometimes allowed communist vs. fascist street brawls and both groups also targeted Jews – except in the American case, the regime would be overseeing a slow-motion collision of far-right militants and far-left agitators who have each, in their own rationale, fixed on Jews as a target. Eventually, this could spiral into coordinated violence: a nightmare scenario would be fringe elements of both sides forming a coalition to plan attacks on Jewish institutions – for example, a neo-Nazi group supplying arms or explosives to an anti-Zionist “anti-capitalist” cell for an attack on a Jewish bank or synagogue. While this sounds far-fetched, the Ynet investigation already documented instances of white supremacists encouraging leftist protesters toward violence. An authoritarian regime might cynically allow such plots to advance, intervening only to reap propaganda benefits (e.g. using a foiled attack as proof of “chaos” that only the strong regime can stop, or, contrarily, turning a blind eye if violence keeps the Jewish community fearful and submissive).
  • Rhetorical and Symbolic Shifts: We could expect significant changes in public rhetoric and symbolism involving Jews. Politicians and officials under the regime might gradually drop the customary condemnations of antisemitism and replace them with more ambiguous language. For instance, instead of explicitly disavowing a neo-Nazi incident, a leader might say, “We oppose hatred, but we won’t let any group manipulate our nation’s finances or culture” – a dog-whistle laden statement that actually validates the hatemongers’ claims. Symbolically, nationalistic ceremonies might exclude Jewish clergy or downplay the Holocaust (perhaps under the pretext of “focusing on American victims” in history). There could even be institutional revisionism, like rewriting school curricula to cast suspicion on Jewish influence in history (e.g. emphasizing instances of Jewish-American communists during the Cold War, or implying American wars were pushed by Jewish lobbyists). All of this normalizes antisemitic assumptions in the culture at large. We might witness a scenario where both a far-right demonstrator and a far-left protester use the same slogan – say, “Down with the 1% globalists!” – one meaning “Jewish bankers” and the other meaning “corporate capitalist class,” but over time the distinction blurs. When antisemitic rhetoric becomes bipartisan in extremist circles, it seeps toward the political center, which could manifest in chilling ways: moderate citizens might start viewing Jewish neighbors with mistrust, believing “well, both the far right and far left agree that something is fishy with those people.”

In combination, these manifestations point toward a society where antisemitism is not a fringe hatred but has been woven into the very narrative fabric by which an authoritarian regime maintains power. It would be a society in which Jews face institutional discrimination, frequent social vilification, and physical danger – all justified by a warped logic acceptable to both ultra-conservatives and ultra-progressives under the regime’s spell.

The Israel Factor: Netanyahu’s Decline and U.S. Narratives

A critical variable in this equation is the role of Israel and its changing image in U.S. politics. Traditionally, U.S. antisemitism has been tempered (or at least complicated) by strong American support for Israel, especially on the right. However, the declining popularity of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government – and the erosion of bipartisan consensus on Israel – could accelerate the convergence of antisemitic narratives in the U.S.

Polling confirms that Netanyahu’s standing among Americans has plummeted. As of 2024, 53% of Americans had little or no confidence in Netanyahu’s leadership on world affairs. Notably, this skepticism is highly partisan: Republicans (especially conservative Republicans) remain far more favorable to Netanyahu than Democrats, among whom confidence in him is in the single digits. In fact, Netanyahu has become a polarizing figure – embraced by the American right and largely rejected by the left. His controversial policies (such as judiciary overhauls seen as authoritarian, and hardline tactics in the Israel–Palestine conflict) have drawn explicit parallels to right-wing authoritarian trends globally. Many Democrats view him as aligned with Trumpism, while many Republicans see him as a heroic bulwark against terrorism.

This polarization has two implications: First, the American right’s near-unconditional support of Netanyahu and Israel provides cover for their own antisemitic elements (as discussed, they cite support for Israel as proof they aren’t antisemitic). Second, the American left’s growing disillusionment with the Israeli government can feed a narrative (especially among far-left activists) that “Zionism” and far-right authoritarianism are two heads of the same beast. In a sense, each side accuses the other of antisemitism: the right says the left’s anti-Israel stance is antisemitism, while the left says the right’s ethno-nationalism and even pro-Israel zeal are themselves a form of antisemitism or at least hypocrisy.

Under a new right-wing U.S. regime, this dynamic could play out dramatically. We can foresee scenarios such as:

  • The regime doubles down on alliance with Israel’s right-wing factions (or with Netanyahu if he is still in power). It might invite Israeli advisors or use Israeli tactics of surveillance and counter-terrorism as models for domestic policy. Publicly, it wraps itself in the Israeli flag to signal civilizational solidarity. However, if Netanyahu’s popularity continues to wane globally and within Israel (where 72% of Israelis in late 2024 wanted him to resign after a war fiasco), the U.S. regime could face a narrative conflict. Should Israel undergo a change (say a more centrist government replaces Netanyahu, or massive internal unrest weakens Israeli stability), the American regime might quietly adjust its tone. It could begin to entertain far-right whispers that “Israel has lost its way to leftists and cannot be trusted”. Already, some on the alt-right have admired Israel only insofar as it was led by someone like Netanyahu; if Israel’s government became more liberal, those admirers could turn on Israel. Therefore, the regime might eventually incorporate Israel or Israeli leadership into its conspiracy lexicon (e.g. “Even Israel isn’t immune to the globalist influence now”). This would complete the convergence by removing the last barrier (the taboo of attacking Israel).
  • Conversely, if Israel remains under rightist leadership but is internationally isolated, the U.S. authoritarian regime might use that as justification to crack down on domestic opponents. For example, it could claim that “Israel, our ally, is under siege by the same forces attacking us at home: globalists, Islamists, and radical leftists”. That narrative portrays American Jews who oppose the regime as traitors not only to America but to Israel as well. Pro-Israel rhetoric thus becomes a bludgeon: dissent = antisemitism (against Israel) and treason. Such a climate could push even moderate Jews into opposition, which perversely feeds the regime’s line that Jews are part of the subversive coalition. Meanwhile, left-wing radicals, seeing the regime’s ultra-pro-Israel stance, intensify their anti-Israel and anti-Zionist fervor, possibly slipping further into antisemitic generalizations out of rage. In short, Israel becomes both a shield and a target – a shield for the regime’s legitimacy and a target onto which the extremes project their hatred.
  • The decline of Netanyahu personally might also remove a charismatic anchor that kept American Christian Zionists fervent. If Netanyahu (whom many U.S. right-wingers saw as a Churchillian figure) falls from power in disgrace or is seen as a failure, some of that zeal may transfer to more openly antisemitic ideologues at home. For instance, American evangelicals might start rationalizing that Jews need to convert or face God’s wrath if even Netanyahu couldn’t save Israel. This could infuse millenarian Christian antisemitism into the political mix alongside secular conspiracies. A right-wing regime with theocratic tendencies (as some neoreactionaries advocate a return to Christian dominion) might then sanction a degree of religious antisemitism, e.g. encouraging conversion campaigns targeting Jews or tolerating rhetoric that “Jews rejected Jesus and thus bring suffering on themselves.” Such theological antisemitism could attract some on the radical right and possibly some anti-religious leftists who see it as payback against a “privileged religious group.” It’s a dangerous feedback loop: losing a pro-Israel consensus frees antisemitic sentiment that was previously kept at bay.

Finally, we should note how state repression and crisis can synergize with the Israel factor. If, for example, the regime faces mass protests (perhaps a coalition of liberals, leftists, and some centrists outraged at authoritarian policies), it might do what many embattled regimes do: start a conflict abroad. A confrontation involving Israel (say, a war with Iran, or a new Intifada) could be stoked to rally nationalist fervor. The regime would demand loyalty in the name of supporting Israel’s fight, painting protesters as not only anti-regime but anti-Israel and thus antisemitic. This martial atmosphere would allow extreme measures at home (martial law, arrests) again under the guise of fighting Jew-hatred and terrorism. Both far-right and far-left antisemites could find validation: the far-right get the war of civilizations they craved (with antisemitic undertones of battling “Israel’s enemies” who they also see as Jewish enemies), while far-left extremists feel vindicated that the regime is essentially a fascist one aligned with Israel, bolstering their hatred of both. In effect, the U.S.-Israel crisis becomes a theater where convergent antisemitism is on full display: the regime and far-right attacking “global Jewry” for undermining the war effort, and the far-left attacking “Zionists” for global war crimes – meeting in the middle at the conclusion that Jewish influence is pernicious.

Case Studies and Parallels

To better understand the plausibility of this convergence, it is helpful to recall a few historical and international parallels where antisemitism transcended left-right boundaries under authoritarian conditions:

  • Nazi Germany (1930s): As discussed, the Nazis masterfully fused anti-capitalist and anti-communist antisemitism. Hitler’s early propaganda appealed to working-class grievances by attacking Jewish bankers (“interest slavery” of finance capital) at the same time as it appealed to conservatives by attacking Jewish Marxists. This “Janus-faced” antisemitism was crucial in building a broad base for authoritarian rule. While Nazi Germany did not tolerate a left-wing movement, it co-opted left-wing anti-elite rhetoric for a right-wing antisemitic agenda – a strategy a U.S. regime could mimic.
  • Stalinist USSR (late 1940s – early 1950s): In a Marxist-Leninist context officially opposed to racism, Stalin nonetheless perpetrated antisemitic purges (e.g. the Doctors’ Plot of 1953 accusing predominantly Jewish doctors of a poison conspiracy). Soviet propaganda in that era denounced “rootless cosmopolitans” and conflated Jews with disloyalty and Western imperialism. Here we see a far-left regime using antisemitism to fuel state repression: it justified harsh censorship and arrests by alleging a Jewish-led plot against the nation’s leader. This mirrors how an ostensibly left-wing narrative (anti-imperialism) was merged with a traditionally right-wing trope (Jews as disloyal) to serve authoritarian ends. The lesson: any regime, regardless of stated ideology, may resort to antisemitism if it needs a scapegoat and an emotive rallying cry.
  • Poland 1968: The communist government’s anti-Zionist campaign, cited earlier, is a quintessential case of ideological convergence. A left-authoritarian party under Gomułka appealed to Polish nationalist and right-wing sentiments by demonizing Jews as a “fifth column” after the Six-Day War. This campaign was wildly successful in stirring up public antisemitism and diverting attention from internal struggles – albeit at the cost of virtually eliminating the remaining Jewish community in Poland. It shows how even a movement claiming to be socialist and anti-fascist can borrow the fascists’ antisemitic playbook when expedient. In the U.S., one could imagine a future authoritarian regime doing the reverse: a right-wing government borrowing left-wing anti-Zionist rhetoric to augment its position. For instance, if faced with international pressure over human rights, the U.S. regime might suddenly find it useful to criticize Israel or “Zionism” (despite its alliances) to gain favor with non-Western powers or domestic left-wingers, thereby throwing Jews under the bus for strategic gain. That kind of cynical pivot was exactly what happened in Poland ’68 – ideology was secondary to retaining power.
  • Modern “Red-Brown” Movements: In recent times, we have seen strange alliances such as the cooperation of far-right Holocaust deniers and far-left anti-imperialists at conferences sponsored by the Iranian regime (a theocratic authoritarian state). The 2006 Tehran Holocaust Conference brought together former KKK leader David Duke and anti-Zionist ultra-left Jewish rabbis, united in Holocaust denial and Israel-hatred. This grotesque meeting of minds underscores how antisemitism provides a lingua franca for extremists. Another example: in Greece’s financial crisis last decade, both the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn and some far-left anarchist groups blamed the EU’s austerity on a Jewish conspiracy (naming bankers or even Germany’s leader as Jewish agents). The convergence of slogans was noted by observers. These parallels, though not identical to a U.S. scenario, indicate that when political systems break down or extremes gain sway, antisemitic narratives tend to bubble up across ideologies.
  • The Middle East “Anti-Zionist” Autocracies: Arab nationalist and Islamist regimes historically positioned themselves as anti-Israel (and often laced that with anti-Jewish themes) while also sometimes dealing with far-right actors internationally. For instance, the secular Ba’athist dictatorships in Iraq and Syria harbored Nazi war criminals and published Protocols-style propaganda, appealing to both pan-Arab leftist anti-colonial rhetoric and classical European antisemitism. The late Libyan dictator Gaddafi at one point advocated a “White Book” response to the Protocols, effectively indulging antisemitic conspiracy claims. These cases illustrate how authoritarian regimes outside the usual Western left-right spectrum have found antisemitism a useful tool to bridge different audiences – whether to unite Islamists and nationalists at home or to curry favor with extremist networks abroad. An American authoritarian regime could likewise use antisemitism as a diplomatic signal – aligning with other illiberal powers (some of whom, like Russia under Putin, flirt with antisemitic tropes about oligarchs and Soros) to create a shared enemy image of “Western liberal (Jewish) influence.”

In reflecting on these case studies, the convergence of antisemitism emerges as a hallmark of extreme politics in crisis. Whenever normal political distinctions break down, the Jewish minority often becomes the convenient unifier for disparate factions. The United States is not immune to this pattern. As our politics becomes more crisis-driven and polarized, the probability increases that a demagogue could harness antisemitic narratives appealing to both right and left grievances.

Conclusion

The specter of a convergence between American right-wing and left-wing antisemitism under a new authoritarian regime is a chilling, but increasingly conceivable, scenario. The groundwork is being laid by rising polarization, the mainstreaming of conspiracy theories, and the cross-contamination of narratives via social media and partisan media ecosystems. A right-wing neoreactionary regime bent on dismantling liberal democracy would have both the motive and means to amplify antisemitism as a tool of rule: motive, because scapegoating Jews could deflect blame for governance failures and channel popular anger outward; means, because it could leverage existing extremist ideas from both ends of the spectrum, uniting them in state propaganda.

In the near- to medium-term future, we might therefore witness a United States where antisemitism shifts from the fringes to an instrument of statecraft. Mechanisms like populist anti-“globalist” rhetoric, two-faced pro-Israel posturing, and repressive “anti-antisemitism” laws would enable the regime to speak to far-right and far-left impulses simultaneously. The narratives would likely revolve around classic themes – the corrupt cosmopolitan financier, the disloyal intellectual, the manipulative Zionist – repackaged in American vernacular but recognizable as age-old tropes. Already, studies show that authoritarian and conspiratorial attitudes correlate strongly with antisemitic beliefs regardless of left/right identity. In an authoritarian America, those attitudes would be deliberately cultivated by the state.

The forms this convergence could take are wide-ranging: institutional (legalized discrimination or purges), cultural (propaganda blending fascist and pseudo-socialist antisemitic myths), violent (from street thuggery to organized terror against Jews), and rhetorical (a normalization of antisemitic codewords in everyday political language). Each reinforces the other. The endgame of such a convergence, if unchecked, is a society where Jews become the universal scapegoat for all discontent – the focus of both government repression and mob aggression.

It is important to stress that this trajectory is not inevitable. It hinges on the success of an authoritarian project and the failure of democratic forces to counter extremist narratives. Understanding how antisemitism can serve as a “cross-ideological glue” is a first step in inoculating society against it. By recognizing when criticism of “elites” or “Zionists” veers into demonization of Jews, both liberals and conservatives of good will can push back and deny an aspiring autocrat that weapon. The convergence thrives on confusion and crisis; clarity and principled leadership can prevent it.

Nonetheless, the analysis here serves as a warning. The declining restraint in political discourse around antisemitic tropes, the partisan weaponization of antisemitism accusations, and the increasing embrace of authoritarian solutions in America form a dangerous nexus. If a right-wing authoritarian regime does emerge, it will likely not invent a new ideology from whole cloth – it will draw on existing threads. Unfortunately, antisemitism is a thread with deep roots in American history (from Henry Ford’s conspiracies to modern internet hate) and across the political spectrum. Under the stress of global and domestic crises, that thread could be woven into a single, dark narrative blanket suffocating the public sphere.

In conclusion, the likelihood of a convergence between right-wing and left-wing antisemitism in a near-future U.S. authoritarian regime is real enough to warrant serious concern. The potential manifestations – whether through institutions or in the streets – would threaten not only the Jewish community but the very fabric of American democracy and pluralism. History shows that when a society’s extremes agree on a scapegoat, the descent into repression and violence accelerates. It will be imperative for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike to recognize these danger signs and uphold a zero-tolerance stance on antisemitism from any quarter. Only by doing so can we deprive a would-be authoritarian regime of one of its most potent and oldest tricks in the book.

Sources:

  • Nazi propaganda portraying Jews as behind both capitalism and communism
  • Koblentz-Stenzler on far-right antisemitic ideology infiltrating the U.S. left after Oct 7, 2023
  • Allington & Hirsh study on antisemitic attitudes across the spectrum and authoritarianism
  • Pew Research on declining American confidence in Netanyahu (53% little/no confidence) and partisan split in support
  • Communist Poland’s 1968 anti-Zionist/antisemitic campaign by a left-wing regime
  • Definition of “Zionist antisemitism” where far-right support for Israel coexists with hatred of Jews